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Lest We Forget was Canada’s official Great War film. It sparked controversy when it was 
shown across the country in 
1935, during the midst of the 
worst depression in Canadian 
history, and with a growing anxiety 
over the increased aggression of 
international dictators. The film 
provided a contested venue for 
what the Great War had meant to a 
generation of Canadians. But this 
was no ordinary war film. Officially 
sanctioned and constructed from 
archival wartime footage, the story 
of Canada’s war was told in 100 
minutes, from the opening phases 
through to the grim fighting on 
the Western Front, and including 
those who supported the soldiers 
from home. Many journalists, 
politicians, and veterans called Lest 
We Forget the most authentic film 
to have appeared since the end of 
the war, especially in contrast to 
Hollywood fictional productions. 
 This article examines the 
conflicting discourse surrounding 
Lest We Forget. While the official 
film, what we would now call a 
documentary, provided important 
insight into the war, and how it 
would be remembered, it probably tells us more 
about the 1930s than the period from 1914 
to 1918. But this is only one part of the story. 
Canada’s Great War film history 
remains largely unexplored.4  
Where did this film footage come 
from? Who filmed Canadians on 
the battlefield? How did these 
cameramen work within the deadly 
environment of shrapnel, snipers, 
and poison gas? How was the film 
footage received during and after 
the war? To better understand 
the importance of Lest We Forget, 
it is not just the film and the 
public’s reaction to it that must 
be analysed, but also the footage 
that was used to underpin the 
narrative. 
* * * * *
When Britain was at war,Canada was at war. 
The heady days of August 1914 
were marked with celebration 
and excitement as Canadians 
clamoured to serve King and 
country. More than 30,000 enlisted 
in the First Contingent and were 
headed overseas by October; 
they were to be joined by almost 
400,000 more in the coming 
years. Most would fight in the Canadian Corps. 
Canada’s Great War on Film
Lest We Forget (1935)
Tim Cook
Lest We Forget will “stand out in the history of filmdom.” Ottawa Evening Journal1  
“Dress Up to See the Slaughter.” Ottawa Citizen2 
Lest We Forget “comes at a very opportune time, with the threat of a new holocaust 
fanning the flame of patriotic spirits to consider the price that war demands from 
civilization.” London Evening Free Press3 
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6The Canadians suffered through the trial-by-fire 
battles of Ypres, St. Eloi, Mount Sorrel and the 
Somme in the first two years of the war. From 
1917 onward, however, the Corps won a string 
of victories at Vimy, Hill 70, Passchendaele, 
and during the Hundred Days campaign. The 
Canadians were forced to adapt as they passed 
through the meat grinder of the Western Front. 
Along with this costly road to professionalism, 
there was an emerging sense of distinctiveness, 
especially in relation to British forces. But this 
did not happen by chance. The Canadian Corps 
had an active publicity campaign throughout 
the war.
 The organization behind this promotion was 
the Canadian War Records Office (CWRO), headed 
by Sir Max Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook, an 
expatriate Canadian millionaire with close ties 
to military and political leaders in both Canada 
and Britain. With characteristic passion, Aitken 
employed his considerable skills as a press baron, 
Member of Parliament, and influential peer to 
nurture a campaign of extolling the heroic deeds 
of Canadians. Journalistic features accentuating 
Canadian exploits, the commissioning of artists 
and photographers to craft Canadian-content 
works, the creation of commemorative journals, 
and even the publication of the first popular 
war histories all helped to shape a distinctive 
Canadian identity. Largely at his own discretion, 
but also supported by Prime Minister Robert 
Borden and Minister of Militia and Defence Sam 
Hughes, Aitken’s plan, when combined with the 
very real accomplishments of the Corps on the 
battlefield, enshrined the Canadians’ reputation 
as elite troops and as a distinctive group within 
the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Aitken 
used film to support his dual mandate of 
publicizing his countrymen, while at the same 
time gathering and preserving war records that 
would be employed by future generations of 
historians to interpret the Great War’s legacy.
 Film was not a new medium. It had attracted 
growing audiences since the turn of the century, 
as it brought stories and images to the 
public, transporting the viewer through 
time and space. Undercutting live theatre 
and music halls, “going to the pictures” was 
a weekly ritual for thousands in Canada, 
and millions around the world: indeed, 
by the summer of 1916, more than twenty 
million tickets were being sold each week 
in England alone.5  With pictures embraced 
by all levels of society, film was seen as a 
unique tool for reaching the masses. The 
importance of the cinema was not lost on 
the CWRO’s senior officers, who noted in 
one memorandum regarding propaganda 
that film “might indeed almost have been 
invented for the purpose.”6  
   As Canadians enlisted by the thousands 
in the first two years of the war, throngs 
of their community members came out 
to see them as they marched, drilled, or 
entrained for their camps, and then went 
overseas. Film producers were obviously 
interested in the pageantry and spectacle 
of the events. When the exuberant and 
vain Sam Hughes visited Victoria, British 
Columbia to inspect troops in January 
Sir Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook) with 
an unidentified woman, 1916. Beaverbrook 
was dedicated to promoting the Canadians, but 
remained an important player in the political and 
social scene in London, England.
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71915, he encountered D.J. Dwyer, an American 
cinematographer, who had been hired to film the 
30th Battalion. The minister was impressed by 
some of the films – especially those that captured 
him strutting around and barking orders. Yet 
not all were pleased with the idea of posing for 
the cameras, and Captain Harry Crerar, a future 
army commander, recounted bitterly a similar 
review in a downpour of rain “for Sam Hughes’ 
benefit and for moving picture operators. A damn 
nuisance and a waste of time.”7 
 Hughes thought otherwise and gave Dwyer an 
honorary title of lieutenant. At his own expense, 
the cinematographer was ordered to England to 
film the Canadians then training on Salisbury 
Plain, with the understanding that all of his film 
would later be transferred to the Public Archives 
as a permanent record.8  The notoriously reserved 
British War Office allowed Dwyer, as Hughes’s 
representative, to document the Canadians, but 
he also free-lanced throughout other training 
camps.9  Canada’s Fighting Forces (1915), his 
film of the Canadian Division and its inspection 
by the King and Lord Kitchener before it was 
sent to France, was shown throughout the 
Empire. It was a commercial success. But aside 
from the appeal of seeing the King and other 
dignitaries, who were popular at all times, there 
was little military footage other than ubiquitous 
training shots, aircraft flying, and a glimpse of 
hospitalized soldiers. 
 In Britain, at the time, film production 
remained with private newsreel companies, but 
they were restricted in what they could cover, and 
always censored heavily. For greater influence, 
they organized themselves into the British Topical 
Committee for War Films in October 1915, and 
succeeded in negotiating an agreement with the 
restrictive War Office to have access to the front 
lines. But it was an unhappy relationship, and 
the War Office was never comfortable in giving 
up control of information. In early 1916, it 
established the War Office Cinema Committee 
to coordinate all films within the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF).10  Sir Max Aitken 
would eventually be appointed to chair this 
committee, but before that he was attempting to 
carve out a reputation for the Canadians.
 Aitken had been appointed as Eye Witness 
for the Canadian forces in January 1915, duly 
reporting back to Ottawa on military and political 
matters.11  But Aitken had proven throughout his 
36 years that he could always exploit a situation 
to his advantage, in business or his personal life, 
and so he expanded his power in the confusing 
structure of the overseas Canadian forces where 
there were, at one time, six generals in various 
competing commands.12  Along with his political 
machinations in Britain’s Tory party, Aitken’s 
goal as Eye Witness, and later Records Officer 
(to which he was appointed in early 1916), 
was simple: “to follow the fortunes of the First 
Division in France, to share its experiences, and 
to give the public of Canada an account of the 
performances of its regiments, and finally to 
enshrine in a contemporary history those exploits 
which will make the First Division immortal.”13  
 He had done this first by writing laudatory 
newspaper accounts that were published in 
Canada and throughout the Empire, and then 
authoring Canada in Flanders (1916), a best-
selling history that highlighted the heroics of the 
Canadian Division during the bloody and costly 
Battle of Second Ypres in April 1915. Aitken 
had indeed begun to fulfill his mandate of both 
documenting and popularizing the Canadian war 
effort.14  
 Aitken also influenced the creation of war 
records in order to lay down the “bedrock of 
history.”15  With his Canadian War Records Office, 
an organization that he established in January 
1916 and initially paid for out of his own pocket, 
he employed wounded soldiers or over-aged 
men to document the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force (CEF).16  Historical officers were sent into 
the field to gather documents and influence 
soldiers to create better records; this they did, 
and after the 1916 Somme battles, the CWRO’s 
intervention improved the quality and scope of 
the War Diaries.17  But Aitken was also anxious 
to present the war to Canadians at home, those 
who worried and waited for loved ones. 
 To do this, however, Canadians needed more 
than evocative newspaper accounts or vivid 
histories. Aitken pushed for greater coverage of 
the war effort through war art, photography, and 
film in the summer of 1916. The War Office fought 
him tooth and nail. But Aitken was a powerful 
figure and had unique rights as Canada’s Eye 
Witness. He refused to back down, enlisting 
allies in England and Canada; yet, as he noted 
wryly later in the war, while still trying to profile 
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8Canadian actions, “the spirit was willing but the 
censorship was by no means weak.”18  With his 
considerable influence, he manoeuvred around 
the War Office’s objections and soon had war 
artists, photographers, and cinematographers 
working to document the Canadians on the 
Western Front. 
 Having missed capturing the first year and 
a half of the war on film, Aitken instructed 
the CWRO to purchase existing footage from 
local companies and gather Dwyer’s films. But 
Dwyer had plans to follow up on the success of 
his earlier film. After bitter accusations, Dwyer 
escaped to Canada with his films, but Aitken, 
furious that the cinematographer was profiting 
from the service of other Canadians, used his 
influence to ban Dwyer from returning to England 
in an official capacity.19  Without this material, 
though, the CWRO had only limited footage of 
Canadians training in England. It was essential 
to get cameramen to the front to fulfil Aitken’s 
twin mandates of publicizing and documenting 
his countrymen in battle. 
 By the summer of 1916, Lieutenant F.O. 
Bovill, a British artillery driver with some film 
experience, was embedded in the CEF. He filmed 
the Somme battles later that year. The footage was 
a stunning success, with Bovill capturing blasted 
landscapes, marching soldiers, lumbering tanks, 
and artillery fire. It was later edited to produce 
a commercially successful film, Canadian 
Victory at Courcelette (1917). “The value of the 
exhibition of these films in Canada can hardly be 
over-stated, while their presentation in neutral 
countries throughout the world will enormously 
enhance the knowledge and renown of Canada,” 
Aitken crowed to Borden.20 
 The films indeed brought attention to the 
Canadian war effort, and the Duputy Minister 
of Militia and Defence, Eugene Fiset, believed 
they were important tools to support morale 
and “serve as an effective antidote to the poison 
of German war pictures” then circulating in 
neutral United States.21  But not all agreed that 
unfettered knowledge of overseas action was 
useful. The strict censorship rules emanating 
from the government’s chief press censor, Ernest 
Chambers, meant that some of the harsher 
images in the films were not presented to the 
Canadian public for fear of affecting enlistment.22  
Chambers hoped to reduce the shock of war even 
though wounded veterans and uncensored letters 
were still finding there way back to Canada.23  
There were also a number of films produced 
domestically that extolled citizens to ration 
their food or support the war effort through the 
patriotic purchase of war bonds.24  Despite the 
censors’ efforts, the war was coming home to 
Canada.
 The CWRO film footage also drew wide-
spread attention in England. Critics complained 
that Aitken’s media blitz of publications, 
photographs, war art, and film made it appear 
that only the Canadians were fighting on the 
Western Front.25  The film footage was especially 
prevalent, and CWRO reports noted sheepishly 
that “there are a disgruntled few who think the 
Canadians’ cameras and films have been too 
busy.” It was, to some, a “crusade by camera.”26  
 When Aitken created his own separate 
Canadian cinematography committee in July 
1916, the War Office was quick to notice the 
Dominion competition with their already 
established network. Shortly thereafter, a joint 
British-Canadian Cinematograph Committee 
was formed with Sir Max as its chairman. The 
committee produced the War Office Official 
Topical Budget, two eight-minute films each 
week that were passed by military censors and 
then distributed throughout the Empire, usually 
shown before or in between longer theatre 
shows. Aitken appointed the Honourable J.W. 
Smith, former Managing Director of Barker 
Motion Photographing Company, to ensure that 
“Canadian interests were safeguarded.”27  On 
direct orders from Aitken, Canadian footage was 
included in every weekly picture, something no 
other Dominion could claim. 
 It was thus the role of the field cinematographers 
to supply the Committee with suitable Canadian 
images. Unfortunately, after Bovill’s excellent 
first shots of the Somme battles, he was unable 
to replicate his success. The Canadian Corps 
processed the hard-won lessons of the Somme 
over the winter of 1916-17 in elaborate training 
programs, but also engaged in an active policy 
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Opposite: Canadian official photographer on the Western 
Front, September 1916. Note the difficulty of filming 
on the open battlefield with no cover. Cameramen and 
cinematographers were often forced to trade distance 
for safety.
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9of trench raiding. These stealth operations were 
almost always carried out at night, and were 
nearly impossible to capture on film. Bovill shot 
new footage in early 1917, and claimed to have 
succeeded in filming some raids, but was later 
forced to admit the film did not turn out due to 
poor lighting.28  
 Bovill’s failure was exacerbated by his 
inability to secure good footage at Vimy Ridge. 
During this coming-of-age battle in April 1917, 
where the four Canadian divisions fought together 
for the first time and drove the Germans from 
their formidable position on the ridge, Bovill’s 
weak footage indicated damningly that he had 
stayed in the rear areas. With only footage of 
troops moving forward and artillery batteries in 
action, it was clear that Bovill had not advanced 
with the infantry. The limitations of the fragile 
hand-cranked cameras no doubt hurt his ability 
to keep up with spearhead units, but it appeared 
that he had not even tried to document the battle 
at the sharp end. Aitken was furious that Bovill 
had failed him, and all Canadians, writing that 
the footage was “absolutely worthless.”29  But 
Bovill survived as a cameraman, continuing to 
shoot footage of Canadian and British troops, 
even though he consistently produced poor work. 
That he was used as a cameraman throughout 
the war spoke more to the lack of experienced 
cinematographers than to Aitken’s generosity.30  
 The art of filming was still relatively new 
and there had been few indigenous Canadian 
companies engaged in the work. Lord 
Beaverbrook, as Sir Max Aitken was known 
after receiving his peerage at the end of 1916, 
turned to the larger BEF and, attesting to his 
influence, was able to secure a number of British 
cameramen. Bovill was placed in a secondary 
role and J.A.B. MacDowell, considered one of the 
best cameramen of the war, took over the role of 
documenting the Canadians in 1917. Geoffrey 
Malins, Walter Buckstone, and Frank Bassill also 
travelled the front looking for suitable Canadian 
shots to meet the film mandate.
 Officers generally cooperated with the 
cameramen, and most liked the idea of appearing 
on film. One artilleryman recounted in his diary 
towards the end of the war: “Some excitement 
was caused when a Canadian moving picture 
outfit came and took movies of ‘A’ gun in action….
They had us all dressed up with the hats and 
gas respirators on, things we didn’t ordinarily 
wear while on gun duty, although we kept them 
handy.”31  Posing was not uncommon for both 
still and moving film, with most soldiers and 
few cameramen worrying about questions of 
authenticity. Yet not all soldiers agreed with this 
publicity campaign. Lieutenant-Colonel Agar 
Adamson of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry wrote disdainfully to his wife of Talbot 
5
Cook: <em>Lest We Forget</em> (1935)
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2005
10
Papineau, one of his former officers, who was 
then working for the CWRO: 
Papineau turned up two days ago with a 
cinematographic camera and wanted us to pose 
for him. I suggested he take photographs of the 
graves of the fallen and ordered him out of the 
line as I did not think it fitting in the present 
critical situation that officers should be going 
about with a Punch and Judy Show.…My views 
are not shared by many Commanding Officers, 
who are only too anxious to advertise themselves 
and rehearse all kinds of stunts when they 
heard they were coming, such as reading maps, 
giving orders, pretending to be shot and carried 
off on stretchers. I only hope the camera gets 
smashed.32 
 The dour Adamson was definitely in the 
minority and much of the surviving war film 
consists of smiling soldiers, often waving for the 
camera. Yet powerful and poignant film was shot, 
and often when soldiers did not realize they were 
in the camera’s lens.
 But cooperation did not ease the ongoing 
problem of securing combat footage: cameramen 
were just as likely to take a bullet in the head 
as an infantryman who looked above a trench 
parapet. With battles going in at night, at dawn 
and, by 1917, behind massive creeping barrages 
of high explosives and shrapnel, sometimes there 
was nothing to see but dust and debris. A number 
of minor Canadian operations in the summer 
of 1917 were filmed but produced little useable 
footage.33  
 L. McLeod Gould of the 102nd Battalion 
described the difficulty of the photographers and 
cameramen in capturing the war on film. While 
the 102nd planned to attack a series of German 
trenches known as the Triangle, east of Vimy 
Ridge in the summer of 1917, Gould noted, 
For the benefit of many who believe that the 
moving-pictures taken under the auspices of 
the Canadian [War] Records Office are ‘faked’ 
it may here be related that during this tour the 
official photographer appeared at Battalion 
Headquarters one evening an hour before a 
double offensive was due. He had been sent up 
in view of the importance of these operations and 
requested to be forward up the line….When the 
action started the shelling was so terrific on both 
sides that it was impossible to see ten yards in 
any direction, dry mud was being blown from 
two to three hundred feet in the air, and this, with 
the smoke, made everything as dark as night.34  
 The photographer returned to Battalion 
command headquarters without any shots, but 
he had been in the front lines. Other experienced 
cameramen like Geoffrey Mallins tried to film the 
Canadians in battle, but much of his footage was 
considered a “complete failure” by the CWRO and 
Lord Beaverbrook.35 
 After several months of shooting, J.A.B. 
MacDowell was getting desperate, and began 
to expose himself dangerously during the 1917 
Passchendaele offensive. But with bullets and 
shrapnel raining down around him, he was 
forced to admit again that since the attacks 
went in under darkness, there was little hope of 
capturing the experience of battle on film. It got 
no easier in the last year of the war, and the series 
of Allied hammer blows against the crumbling 
German armies in the campaigns that made up 
the Hundred Days (August to November 1918) 
were equally difficult to shoot. But the footage 
for this period was far stronger, with images of 
advancing soldiers, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. 
Yet still the fighting eluded the cameramen who 
remained constrained by their cumbersome and 
unwieldy equipment, and the nature of combat. 
Most of the film footage was shot behind the lines, 
away from danger. 
 Beaverbrook and the CWRO were forced 
to settle for these shots to fulfil the publicity 
and record-keeping functions. In the summer 
of 1918, moreover, Beaverbrook ordered a 
full-length Canadian film to be produced. The 
Battle of Courcelette (1918) was shot by W.R. 
Boothe, directed by Smith, and distributed by 
the CWRO in Britain and, ultimately, to Canadian 
theatres. Recreations were mixed with real film 
footage; maps and diagrams of the Canadian 
divisional advances were juxtaposed to create 
the image of “victory succeed[ing] victory.”36  It 
was a resounding success. The equally popular, 
The Taking of Vimy Ridge (1919), was shown 
across Canada the next year.37  
 Lord Beaverbrook’s films were acknowledged 
as a propaganda coup.38  By the end of the war, 
there were two full-length Canadian films, nine 
shorts and thousands of feet of additional 
footage that had been supplied to the British 
cinematography committee to be used in imperial 
productions. When the profits were tallied, a 
£10,000 cheque was awarded to the Canadian 
government, which was double that received by 
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the Australians and New Zealanders because 
Beaverbrook’s men had shot and contributed 
more footage.39  Beaverbrook’s patronage had 
been responsible primarily for this success: 
his quest to make the Canadian actions of the 
war known widely had paid both financial and 
publicity dividends at little cost to Canadians, 
while leaving a legacy of historical film for future 
generations. 
* * * * *
As the citizen-soldiers were being repatriated home in early 1919, one Canadian 
commentator acknowledged that it was 
Beaverbrook’s foresight and hard work that 
had provided “a national record of inestimable 
historical value.”40  Indeed, Beaverbrook’s war 
art, photographs, and film form the core of the 
war’s visual language. But just as there were 
plans for a war museum to house the impressive 
war art collection and an official historian to 
codify the war in print, Beaverbrook had hoped 
that there would also be an official war 
film so that Canadians could “see what 
their brothers, husbands, and sons did 
during the Great War.”41  However, it would 
be almost two decades before Canadians 
would again see the footage. 
 W h e n  B e a v e r b r o o k ’ s  B r i t i s h 
cinematography committee was closed 
and the film rights sold for a profit in 
1919, those films relating to Canada 
were sent back to the Army Historical 
Section (AHS) in Ottawa. But there were 
no cinematographical experts on staff 
at the AHS and the cans of film were 
deposited in the archives to gather dust 
alongside the textual records. No one even 
inspected them. When they were finally 
examined by the official historian, Colonel 
A.F. Duguid, three years later, he found to 
his surprise that most of the films were 
positives and scratched beyond repair. 
No copies could be made from them in 
their pitiful condition, and the film was 
already beginning to break down under the 
fluctuating heat and humidity within the 
archives.42  As well, many films appeared 
to be missing. That same year, after some 
of the CWRO film surfaced at a local theatre, 
Duguid organized a nationwide search to locate 
additional film. A number of British films, like 
the Battle of Arras (1917), were found and added 
to the collection, but not the important Canadian 
footage.
 The Legion was alerted to the situation and 
posted advertisements to its members, but very 
soon it, and other wartime patriotic institutions, 
like the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, 
were pressuring Duguid to allow the existing film 
to be shown at various branches or reunions. 
Duguid demurred, writing to J.H. MacBrien, chief 
of the general staff, that these valuable archival 
records had to be preserved and restored before 
anyone could use them. The Legion continued 
to appeal to the AHS: with a war museum and 
the multi-volume official history delayed, the 
former until 1942, the latter never completed, an 
official film, argued veterans, would help to stir 
old memories and provide a proper memorial 
to their deeds and that of their fallen comrades. 
Colonel A.F. Duguid, official historian. Duguid 
believed passionately in memorializing the 
Canadian war effort, but had no experience 
with film. 
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In 1926, to avoid increasing demands, Duguid 
transferred the archival film collection of 144 
separate reels, more than 30,000 feet of footage, 
to the Dominion Archivist, Arthur Doughty, for 
“preservation and safe-keeping.”43  
 But Canadians continued to show an 
interest in the Great War, even if they preferred 
romanticized novels to the war poetry and fiction 
that questioned the futility of the trenches. The 
cartoons of Bruce Bairnsfather and his lovable 
‘Ol’ Bill,’ the “everyman” who represented the 
“poor bloody infantry,” remained far more 
popular than the poetry of Wilfrid Owen or 
Siegfried Sassoon.44  Attesting to Bairnsfather’s 
enduring appeal, and with successful London and 
Broadway plays under his belt, he was enticed 
to make a major Canadian-produced film, Carry 
on Sergeant! (1928). 
 Despite Bairnsfather’s international success, 
a cartoonist does not make a director. Cost 
overruns drove up the budget to an incredible 
$350,000. Furthermore, a confusing and, in 
parts, racy story that attempted to portray 
both the comedy and tragedy of war – and 
failed at both, when combined with the 
misfortune of being released just when 
the first “talkies” were hitting the screen, 
resulted in an expensive fiasco.45  It nearly 
destroyed the emerging Canadian film 
industry and put paid to an official war film. 
 However, in the aftermath of Carry on 
Sergeant!, the Department of National 
Defence contacted Doughty in April 1929 
to enquire about the “priceless historical” 
film records, and what could be done about 
them. Doughty, Duguid, and F.C. Badgley 
from the Government Motion Picture 
Bureau (GMPB), the precursor organization 
to the National Film Board, organized a 
committee to study the film issue. They 
determined that conservation had to be 
carried out immediately since the films 
were “worse than anyone thought.” Many 
of the original films had also been cut up 
and their provenance destroyed by editing 
different parts together. More problematic 
were the significant gaps in the film collection, 
which former CWRO members confirmed after 
seeing the existing footage.46  Conservation was 
begun but important footage remained lost.
 The dark years of the Depression were 
painful for most Canadians and, as R.B. 
Bennett’s government struggled to deal with the 
unprecedented economic collapse, plans for an 
official war film were again side-lined. Even the 
Legion was preoccupied with petitioning support 
for suffering veterans. But there was a turn of fate 
in early 1933 as George Drew, an artillery veteran 
and politician, was rummaging through basement 
vaults at the Ontario Motion Picture Bureau. He 
came across tins of celluloid and they were shown 
at his brigade’s reunion dinner that night. With 
the gunners reliving old memories as the black 
and white images flickered across the screen, the 
chief of the general staff, A.G.L. McNaughton, also 
a Great War gunner, remarked: “I’ll be swizzled….
Those are the ruddy things we’ve been looking 
Arthur Doughty, Dominion Archivist. During the war, 
Doughty had gone overseas to collect war trophies; 
afterwards, he distributed many of them throughout 
the country as symbols of Canada’s war effort. He 
was a driving force in presenting Lest We Forget to 
Canadians.
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for.”47  Drew had uncovered 25,000 feet of lost 
Canadian footage. The newspapers reported 
widely that the “long lost war films” had been 
uncovered, and there was a renewed push to have 
these “authentic pictures of warfare” shown to all 
Canadians. The official footage, newspaper men 
intoned, would counter the untruthful scenes 
presented “from the screen of Hollywood and 
elsewhere.”48  
 Bennett responded to this pressure from 
veterans, politicians, the media, and even the 
Governor General, by forming another committee 
shortly after the gunner’s dinner. Doughty, 
McNaughton, Duguid, and Badgely examined tens 
of thousands of feet of film for a possible official 
production. Yet as the committee carried out their 
work, Bennett’s Cabinet worried that a war film 
might spark unwanted passions among citizens 
suffering through the Depression. Moreover, 
the peace movement of the 1920s, which had 
rallied around the mantra of the “war to end all 
wars,” would not stand for any glorification of the 
conflict. Bennett and his Cabinet felt an official 
war film could be a combustible spark that 
might set the country’s veterans against the peace 
movement. But the veterans could not be ignored, 
especially since they had powerful influence in 
the House of Commons and the Cabinet. 
 Doughty’s committee examined 60,863 
feet of footage in order to select about 9,000 
feet (two hours) for a film. Captain William 
Douglas, a CWRO veteran and employee with 
the GMPB, selected film clips from 685 films of 
varying lengths, while W.W. Murray, another CEF 
veteran, wrote the script. A musical score was 
commissioned. Douglas reported that there were 
powerful and evocative shots, but no footage that 
showed any front line fighting. In telling Canada’s 
Great War history, the official film would be 
constrained by what Beaverbrook’s cameramen 
had shot during the war. 
 It was equally difficult to craft the film’s 
message. By the 1930s, the memory of the 
Great War had become far more contested with 
the release of antiwar books, of which Erich 
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front 
(1930) remained the best known. The Academy 
award-winning film of the same name also 
stimulated a new approach to tackling the Great 
War on film, and especially the suffering of the 
common soldier.49  But much of the CWRO’s 
footage had focused on battles, generals and 
politicians, and there were no interviews and 
few highlights of individual soldiers. How would 
Canadians accept this lack of coverage? 
 There was the possibility of filming new 
scenes, but this was condemned by the committee 
since it would detract from the authenticity of the 
original records. To hold the title, official, the film 
would have to be based on real footage. Most of it 
was, although there was some realistic wartime 
recreated segments, like the assassination 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. However, this 
footage was indicated at the start of the film as a 
“faithful reproduction according to the historical 
record.”50  To help augment the film, moreover, 
the committee was able to draw upon British, 
French, and German footage, some of which was 
in the Canadian collection. The committee also 
aimed to place the Canadian war effort within 
the larger Allied campaigns, and there was a 
conscious attempt to avoid the “impression that 
Canada won the war.”51  McNaughton ordered 
that the film avoid the “’heroes’ sort of thing or 
sob stuff,” but it also had to have, Badgely noted, 
a “theatrical punch or it won’t go over” with the 
public.52  The film was cut and edited; the script 
written and rewritten.
 Yet still Bennett’s Cabinet worried about 
how the film would be received, and while 
Donald Sutherland, the minister of national 
defence, pushed hard for the film’s authorization, 
assuring the prime minister that there would 
be no “glorification of war,” and that it was 
the government’s duty to show these “valuable 
records” lest they be “lost to posterity,” many 
other ministers feared the war and its contested 
memory. It had been too divisive and painful, 
and none wanted to remind Canadians that 
it had been Conservatives who had enacted 
conscription.53  
 The authorization to release the film was a 
near run thing and the Cabinet was still against 
it even after a private showing. But veterans in 
Bennett’s government rallied behind the cause. 
McNaughton even went so far as to warn the 
prime minister that “we may expect a great 
volume of serious criticism” if the film is further 
delayed.54  Some of the contentious images were 
struck from the film, like dismembered bodies, 
as well as the question of “fixing the blame for 
the outbreak of the war directly on Germany.”55  
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Additional last minute changes included adding 
more material relating to the patriotic war work 
on the home front, especially the role of women.56  
A final letter by Doughty to the Cabinet won 
the case: “The picture…depicts scenes of self-
sacrifice and heroism, of devoted sacrifice and 
of patriotic effort, and will lay before those who 
see it a heritage of tradition of self forgetfulness 
and of loyalty which has been wrought into the 
fabric of the life of Canada. It portrays the stark 
reality of War, its futility and its terrors, so that 
this method of settling disputes between nations 
may be dreaded and avoided.”57  After months 
of debate, the Cabinet finally acted decisively: 
it transferred responsibility for the film to the 
Legion. The official war film would be released 
to Canadians in March 1935, under the title of 
Lest We Forget.
* * * * *
De s p i t e  t h e  C a b i n e t ’ s caution and delay in authorizing Lest We 
Forget, it is perhaps not surprising that most 
of its members were in attendance for the film’s 
opening night at the Princess Theatre in Ottawa 
on 7 March 1935. The Legion was hosting the 
event, but dignitaries like the Governor General, 
Bennett, and senators joined veterans. “The Gala 
Performance promises 
to be the outstanding 
social event of the Ottawa 
season,” predicted one 
newspaper.58  Attesting 
to the pageantry of the 
evening, veterans were 
given permission to 
wear their uniforms at 
the performance. 
 Brigadier-General 
Alex Ross, Dominion 
president of the Legion, 
opened the ceremonies 
b y  r e m i n d i n g  t h e 
packed crowd that the 
picture opening was 
not a “social event,” as 
some of the newspapers 
had made it out to be, 
but rather a “solemn 
occasion, long desired 
by the veteran body 
of Canada, which has 
felt it necessary that war be portrayed in all its 
stark reality.” And that stark reality could be 
shown because there was a “complete historical 
narrative of the war compiled from the archives 
of allied and enemy nations, as well as from our 
records, so that those who see may understand 
its genesis, its progression, and its terrible 
aftermath.” The official film would contrast 
favourably, he claimed, with Hollywood fictional 
accounts. He was followed by Captain Ben Allen, 
president of the Ottawa Legion Branch, who 
extended a welcome to all the distinguished 
guests and led the audience in three wartime 
songs: It’s a Long Way to Tipperary, Pack Up 
Your Troubles in Your Old Kit Bag, and There’s a 
Long, Long Trail A-Winding.59  As the crowd sang 
or hummed half forgotten, maudlin songs, this 
act of personal and public commemoration drew 
on the nostalgic past to help frame the coming 
film. 
 Lest We Forget covered the whole war, placing 
Canadian events within the larger international 
context. Unique naval images of the sinking of 
the German battleship Blucher led to the land 
war, and years of trench warfare. The striking 
shots that Bovill had captured on the Somme 
were a highpoint of the film, but so too were 
the powerful images from the Hundred Days. 
But many viewers must 
have been disappointed 
with the weak footage 
of Vimy, a symbol of 
Canada’s success and 
sacrifice during the 
war. Graphics helped 
to convey the nature 
of battles that had not 
been captured on film. 
“There was another 
feeling mingled with 
the sense of drama, 
for here were real men 
being maimed and 
killed, real bodies lay 
amidst the mud and 
ruins,” recounted one 
of the lucky newspaper 
men allowed into the 
thea t r e . 60   Equa l l y 
interesting was the 
reaction of the crowd 
that broke into applause 
w h e n  w e l l - k n o w n 
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p e r s o n a l i t i e s , 
both military and 
political, appeared 
on the screen, like 
Sir Robert Borden, 
Sir Arthur Currie, 
Sir Sam Hughes, 
Lord Kitchener, or 
Woodrow Wilson. 
Here were leaders, 
almost all dead now, 
who still inspired a 
sense of patriotism. 
The antiwar spirit of 
the late 1920s was 
not present on this 
night of ceremony 
and pomp. 
 The film ended 
with the ominous 
phrase from the 
narrator: “Was it a 
war to end war, did 
it attain its desired 
end – or did it not?” 
With the rise of Adolf 
Hitler in Germany, 
Benito Mussolini in 
Italy, and Japanese 
aggression in the 
Far East, more than 
a few film-goers must have been troubled as 
they left the theatre. Had the war accomplished 
anything? For the British Empire, the question 
could only be, yes. Germany had been stopped, 
aggression punished, the Kaiser’s quest for 
greater power blocked. But the real question was 
if the war was worth the cost, and could a film 
address those complex issues?
 This night of relived memories became the 
focus for an intense debate in the media, in 
Parliament, and among veterans. Lest We Forget 
was discussed, critiqued, and celebrated over 
the coming months as it was shown across the 
country. There was no meta narrative, no uniform 
discourse: some newspapers and letter-writers 
saw it as the glorification of war while others 
found it coloured distastefully by an antiwar 
fervour; some argued that all citizens of the 
country should see the film, others thought it too 
horrific for children, and much too dangerous for 
the vast unemployed men who might either join 
the army or turn to 
anti-establishment 
organizations. It 
was clear, however, 
that footage shot 
by  the  CWRO’s 
cameramen had 
been made initially 
for publicity and 
historical record 
purposes, but now 
the viewers were 
ascribing to it their 
own values, fears, 
and worries.
    “Patrons of 
the Canadian dead 
soldiers have a 
special opportunity, 
i n  c omf o r t ab l e 
seats, to see the 
g lamour  o f  the 
human slaughter 
-house,” was the 
scathing rev iew 
by  the  Ot tawa 
Citizen.61  The dead 
deserved better: 
they  should ,  i t 
would appear, be 
commemorated in 
sombre and reverential tones. Another reviewer 
suggested that the film was an “effort to portray 
the tragic futility of war and to bring home 
through the visible sense the stupidity and folly 
of armed conflict.” That had not been the goal of 
the film-makers, but the same reviewer also noted 
that as the “real pictures, taken in many cases in 
the height of battle, were thrown on the screen, 
veterans of various ranks actually saw themselves 
once more ‘going over the top’ or advancing over 
‘No Man’s Land’ to their objective.” This was 
a chance to see the “privates and non-coms” 
who had “won the war.” Thus, not only did the 
Ottawa Journal categorize Lest We Forget as an 
“anti-war” film, but also one where the forgotten 
“poor bloody infantry” finally had a chance to 
be recognised for their bravery and devotion to 
duty.62  
 Yet some Canadians res-ponded angrily to 
these negative reviews. A.U.G. Berry, a Member 
of Parliament, felt the reviews were an insult to 
Still images of soldiers leaving a trench captured from the film 
Lest We Forget.
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the dead, “whose 
deeds and death it 
com-memorates.”63  
S t u n g  b y  t h e 
attack, the Ottawa 
Citizen’s editorial 
board responded 
that  i t  was not 
the film to which 
they had objected, 
but the pageantry 
surrounding the 
event, especially 
since “millions were 
on the dole” and 
suffering despite the 
many “sacrifices [of] 
Canadian soldiers.” 
Using the film and 
its docu-mentation 
o f  s a c r i f i c e  a s 
a  spring-board, 
critics attacked the 
Bennett government 
for failing to live 
up to the legacy 
of the Great War 
soldiers. The grim 
circumstance of 
Canadian society in 
1935, where both 
war and capitalism 
w e r e  b e i n g 
questioned, was influencing some reviewers, 
and presumably audiences. 
 The debate engendered by the film moved 
from the media to the House of Commons and 
into the Senate chambers. After seeing the movie, 
the pacifist and leader of the Progressives, J.S. 
Woodsworth, questioned the yearly allotment of 
money to the Department of National Defence, 
and thought the funds could be used, as Lest We 
Forget had reminded all viewers, he suggested, 
to find new steps for “world peace.”64  Senator 
Jas Murdock evoked the film to address similar 
questions, and although he believed it provided 
one of the “finest historical records” of the war, 
he worried that the scenes of brutality and 
patriotism might promote dangerous passions 
in its viewers. Every Canadian over the age of 
thirty should see the film, he thought, but it 
would be a “crime against humanity” to show it 
to “impressionable youth” who might be driven 
to martial solutions 
d u r i n g  t h e s e 
difficult Depression 
years. Former Prime 
Minister Arthur 
Meighen took on 
b o t h  M u r d o c k 
and Woodsworth, 
thundering in one 
speech that being a 
pacifist is fine, “but 
we do not find him 
in the danger zones 
where the world’s 
troubles are being 
b r e w e d ,  w h e r e 
treaties are being 
torn in the tatters 
and thrown to the 
winds of heaven.” 
Lest We Forget was 
based on official 
footage shot during 
the war and would 
help, he opined, 
steel the youth of 
today for future 
conflict. Despite not 
having seen the film, 
Meighen believed it 
was “propaganda 
for peace.” But if 
“war has to come,” 
Canadians “are prepared to do their duty.”65  
Lest We Forget was inciting passions to fight for 
peace, prepare for war, and perhaps galvanize the 
unemployed masses against the failed capitalist 
system. 
 That same year, the Canadian Military 
Gazette drew its readers to the “very bitter 
controversy” over the film, but also felt that Lest 
We Forget neither promoted nor was against war, 
but simply “a complete historical narrative of the 
war, compiled from the archives.” The footage 
“cannot but excite admiration for the devotion of 
the cameramen who took many of the pictures 
in the thick of bitter engagements, periling their 
lives with the same abandon as did the actual 
fighting.” The memory of war would resist the 
ravages of time, especially since film “taken on 
the spot cannot lie.”66  Despite the naiveté of 
assuming the impartiality of film, the Gazette 
hoped it would not be employed to support 
Images of soldiers working in a trench captured from the film 
Lest We Forget.
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol14/iss3/2
17
polemic causes, but rather would simply stand 
as a record of the war. 
 As Lest We Forget was shown across the 
country, advertisements were equally ambivalent 
about the film’s message. In Toronto, the 
billboards shouted: “THE TRUTH AT LAST 
from the OFFICIAL war films.” “Truth” and 
“official” could not help but be observed.67  With 
advertisements claiming, “War as it really was!,” 
it seemed as if the war experience had been 
captured and displayed for all Canadians.68  Yet 
as a record of combat, it could only present 
part of that experience. It might not lie, but 
it certainly did not tell the whole truth. Film 
imposed structure on a chaotic situation: it 
brought order to the inherently disordered. 
Generals seemed to have control over their 
plans; soldiers were smiling and anxious 
for battle. Although there were powerful and 
disturbing images of advancing soldiers, tanks, 
and corpses, film could not convey the smell of 
rotting flesh, the constant fatigue that plagued all 
men, the discomfort of living in open ditches, the 
cacophony of brutal sounds, or the waves of fear 
emanating from young boys about to go “over the 
top.” After viewing the films, many must have felt 
that they now understood the experience of war; 
unfortunately, it was, for the most part, much 
worse than they could ever have imagined.69  
 In one of the most virulent 
denouncements of the film, 
Margaret Curry, a former 
wartime nurse, questioned 
how any could call this film 
an actual representation of 
the war: 
Did it bring to their nostrils 
the stench of gangrene, 
the sight of the poor head 
wounds plucking out their 
brains with their fingers; 
the pitiful wrecks of shell-
shocks, the death of the tetanus patients?... 
If this wonderful film really showed the ‘stark 
realities of war’ it should show the death of 
gassed patients….They were terrible deaths to 
behold. Did any…ever see...death by gas...his 
protruding eyes and the blood streaming from 
them, his lolling tongue, his bleeding ears, his 
terrible rasping gasps, his clutching hands to his 
throat - ah, they will want the curtain drawn.70  
 Another commentator, future diplomat Escott 
Reid, writing in Saturday Night, queried the very 
nature of the film: “What is it that they wanted 
to persuade us not to forget?” The film rightly 
highlighted the bravery of the soldiers, Reid 
noted, but it “did little to make us remember 
the stupidity of the generals who planned the 
Passchendaele offensive and other equally 
murderous mistakes or what the troops felt about 
the stupidity of the generals.” As Reid remarked 
acidly: “a film sponsored by the Department of 
National Defence of Canada naturally prefers as 
its unavowed title ‘Let us Forget the Stupidity of 
Generals.’”71 
 Despite the bitter controversy, Lest We Forget 
played for over a year in Canadian theatres, 
grossing more than $34,000.72  It was not a 
blockbuster, but since it had been produced for 
almost nothing, these were significant profits. The 
film also had a successful international run, and 
Beaverbrook’s footage again helped to represent 
Canadians throughout the British Empire.73  
 But the true legacy of the film remains its 
contested interpretation. Lest We Forget propelled 
constituents to reach far beyond a simple narrative 
and to question the meaning of the war. These 
reactions cannot be separated from the year 
of its showing in 1935, with domestic anguish 
over the Depression and 
the internationally inspired 
fear of another world-wide 
conflict between forces of 
Fascism, Communism, and 
Democracy. Clearly, too, 
the impact of the film was 
partially due to its official, 
seemingly authentic nature. 
But Beaverbrook had aimed 
to both document the war 
and publicize the Canadian 
war effort. His film footage 
was shot for a purpose; 
yet two decades later a far different film was 
presented. While there are no answers to the 
multiple meanings interwoven or underpinning 
Lest We Forget, and how it was interpreted by 
Canadians across the country, one is tempted 
to agree with a contemporary reviewer who 
declared that it was “the most important film of 
the decade.”74  
* * * * *
Still image of dead soldiers captured from the 
film  Lest We Forget.
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Lest We Forget is tame to modern eyes, especially in the aftermath of the hyper-
realism of Stephen Spielberg’s Saving Private 
Ryan (1998) or other modern war films. But Lest 
We Forget has much to tell us of the Great War. 
The war’s memory had become contested ground 
by 1935, especially when viewed after the waves 
of antiwar literature of the 1920s. And while these 
protest works were not accepted by all, and were, 
for the most part, an aspect of elite discourse, 
the fame and international support of the film, All 
Quiet on the Western Front, reached many more 
Canadians. The war could not be portrayed in the 
same terms as Beaverbrook might have hoped in 
its immediate aftermath, but nor could it be an 
antiwar film since the memory of the war was not 
one of utter hopelessness and suicidal attacks. 
The fighting had been terrible, but it had been, 
in the minds of most Canadians, fought for a just 
cause: to stop German aggression and to support 
the British Empire, and the important values 
for which it stood. These were messages woven 
into the film and juxtaposed against the terrible 
cost of the war. In the mid-1930s, though, it was 
inevitable that the film would question whether 
the terrible bloodletting had been worth the 
cost, especially with the rise of dictators around 
the world. Some used the film as a warning to 
the future: both to rearm or prepare for peace. 
Neither message was part of the film’s narrative, 
but resonated with many viewers. 
The film-makers had aimed to offer an authentic 
glimpse into Canada’s part in the war. Yet just 
as no history can fully capture the past, neither 
can a poem, a play, or a film. While participants 
could use their memories to craft postwar works, 
without Lord Beaverbrook’s foresight, there 
would have been almost no moving picture legacy 
of Canada’s part in the war. To both understand 
Lest We Forget, and the history behind this 
important record, it is worth remembering that 
war footage consists of not only what the soldiers 
did, but what the cameramen could shoot. 
 This existing wartime footage, which is 
used and reused in every History Television 
documentary or National Film Board production, 
is all we shall ever have in representing the 
moving picture legacy of Canadians in the Great 
War.75  Beaverbrook’s desire to publicize and 
document Canada’s Great War sacrifice ensured 
that aspects of that experience were captured on 
film. But it was selective, and the result must be 
necessarily that the war will be reinterpreted by 
each succeeding generation. However, with the 
CWRO film footage, we have a better opportunity 
to do just that, and build upon Beaverbrook’s 
bedrock of history.
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